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NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW-VOL. 42, NO. 1
THE FOURTH AMENDMENT AND EVIDENCE
OBTAINED BY A GOVERNMENT AGENT'S TRESPASS
Charles H. Rogers*
INTRODUCTION
The fourth amendment to the United States Constitution states
that "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall
not be violated. . . ." The United States Supreme Court has held
that in order to protect this right, evidence obtained by an un-
reasonable search and seizure conducted by agents of any govern-
mental body in the United States (hereinafter referred to as gov-
ernment agents) may be suppressed in any criminal proceeding,
by a defendant whose rights were invaded by the search.' In each
case the crucial issue becomes one of defining and determining
what constitutes an unreasonable search and seizure. The test
established by the United States Supreme Court is whether or not
there has been an unauthorized physical encroachment within a
constitutionally protected area.2
First, an examination of the Supreme Court's decisions using
this test will be made. The indiscriminate use or non-use of local
and common law standards in the Court's application of the rule
has rendered the results very inharmonious, and the results in any
future case where the test is applied unpredictable at best.
Second, an examination will be made of three lines of cases or
routes which the lower federal courts have followed in determining
which areas are within the fourth amendment's protection from
unauthorized encroachments. The purpose of this is to ascertain
which route is the most conducive to decisions which follow the
spirit as well as the letter of the fourth amendment guarantees.
Third, what constitutes an unauthorized encroachment will be
determined. It will be noticed that most of the decisions have
been based upon the common law distinctions of tort and real
* B.A. 1960, University of Nebraska; LL.B. 1962, University of Nebraska;
Member, Illinois State Bar Ass'n. Presently employed by Thompson,
Raymond, Mayer & Jenner, Chicago, Ill.
1 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383(1914).
2 Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505 (1961).
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property, distinctions which have not been defined to any extent
by the Supreme Court.
Lastly, a recent case in the federal court of appeals will be
examined to see why there is a need for the Supreme Court to
establish some workable standards in this area.
In conclusion, it will be shown that the present test should be
delineated in a specific manner in order to insure uniformity and
certainty in its application by all courts. Additional standards
necessary to insure that the fourth ammendment guarantee of a
right of privacy is an actual, rather than a theoretical, right will
also be delineated.
I. THE PRESENT TEST
To illustrate the current test, it is necessary to examine a recent
Supreme Court decision, Silverman v. United States,3 and a re-
markably similar case therein distinguished, Goldman v. United
States.4 In both cases a federal officer obtained evidence against a
defendant by the use of an electronic listening device in an ad-
joining room. The evidence was held admissible in Goldman,
inadmissible in Silverman. The one significant difference (at least
in the eyes of the Court) was that, while the listening device in
Silverman penetrated one-fifth of an inch into the common wall,
the device in Goldman merely was attached to the government's
side of the wall. Mr. Justice Stewart, speaking for the majority
in the Silverman case, distinguished Goldman on the ground that
"[T]he eavesdropping had not been accomplished by means of an
unauthorized physical encroachment within a constitutionally pro-
tected area."5 On the issue of whether or not the "encroachment"
was "unauthorized," the Court refused to apply the local law of
the District of Columbia.6 According to the Court, "Inherent Fourth
Amendment rights are not inevitably measurable in terms of
ancient niceties of tort or real property.' 7 Thus, in this case the
Court found a trespass because there was an encroachment in the
narrowest sense of the word (one-fifth of an inch), even though
entry would have been authorized under local law.
3 Ibid.
4 316 U.S. 129 (1942).
5 Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 510 (1961).
6 Technically, there was no trespass in Silverman because the entry was
into a party wall. See Fowler v. Koehler, 43 App. D.C. 349 (Sup.Ct.
1915).
7 Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961).
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It may be that the Court was dissatisfied with the Goldman
decision and simply refused to extend it-even one-fifth of an inch;
the same reluctance to apply local law in determining whether or
not the encroachment was authorized can be seen in Chapman v.
United States.8 In Chapman the landlord consented to (and even
urged) the entry of the officers into a house occupied by Chapman.
Under state law, it was questionable whether this entry was "un-
authorized." The Court concluded that it was unauthorized. The
majority opinion indicated that the law surrounding a constitutional
right should not include fine distinctions; thus, the Court, in effect,
refused to apply local law. Mr. Justice Clark, in dissenting,9
asserted that local law should be applicable. To this writer, a
local standard is inadequate. First, local property law was not
formulated for the purpose of protecting the constitutional right
of privacy. Secondly, local law would not provide the uniformity
essential to secure equal constitutional rights to every citizen of
the United States. The rights of a citizen of Georgia would be
different from the rights of a citizen in each of the other forty-nine
states, and constitutional rights could be abridged or altered by
the state legislatures.
Since the standard of unreasonableness is seemingly based upon
a "trespass-upon-protected-area" test, the courts have found it
necesary to apply some law of trespass. The Supreme Court would
seem to be the proper body to designate which law of trespass
should apply; however, the opinions discuss trespass in only a
general manner. In two landmark search and seizure cases, Olin-
stead v. United States,10 and On Lee v. United States," the Court
applied a common law trespass notion. In two other cases, Jones
8 365 U.S. 610 (1961).
9 Id. at 619.
10 277 U.S. 438 (1928). In the Olmstead case the Supreme Court refused
to apply the sanctions of the fourth amendment against evidence ob-
tained by wire tapping when there was no physical trespass upon the
defendant's premises.
11 343 U.S. 747 (1952). The majority opinion in On Lee v. United States
stated: "[N]o trespass was committed." The agent went into the peti-
tioner's place of business "with the consent, if not by the implied invita-
tion, of the petitioner." This wording was auoted in Silverman v. United
States, 365 U.S. 505, 510 (1961).
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v. United States12 and United States v. Jeffers,13 the Court refused
to apply the common law trespass rules, and yet found no neces-
sity to distinguish the prior cases. So far the Court has dealt
specifically with each aspect of, or exception to, the general law
of trespass. This method is wholly unsatisfactory since there are
multitudinous exceptions in the law of trespass which are given
multifarious treatment by the many common law jurisdictions.
II. DEFINING THE CONSTITUTIONALLY PROTECTED AREA
A. CASES FOLLOWING THE RULE OF HESTER V. UNITED STATES 14
Hester v. United States is the leading case analyzing the ad-
missibility of evidence obtained by trespassing governmental agents.
Be it rightly or wrongly interpreted, Hester has been a most prolific
source of federal court rulings as to the illegal possession of nar-
cotics and liquor. The facts of the case are fairly simple and, if
taken at face value, the case would have been of little moment in
the law of search and seizure.
Hester was convicted of concealing distilled spirits. He ap-
pealed to the United States Supreme Court on the ground that the
testimony of two federal agents was obtained in contravention of
the fourth amendment and should have been omitted under the
exclusionary rule of Weeks v. United States.15 The two agents were
revenue officers who had concealed themselves fifty to one hundred
yards away from a house owned by Hester's father. When the
alarm was given, Hester ran, dropping the jug he was carrying.
The two agents testified as to the contents of the broken jug. The
agents further testified as to the contents of a broken bottle which
was thrown by Hester's cohort, and a broken jug found outside the
home. The Supreme Court upheld the lower court's refusal to ex-
clude the testimony. Mr. Justice Holmes, speaking for the Court,
12 362 U.S. 257 (1960). Jones complained of an illegal search of an apart-
ment. The Court refused to hold that he had no standing to complain
on the ground that he was merely an invitee or guest. It said, 'We are
persuaded... that it is unnecessary and ill-advised to import into the
law surrounding the constitutional right to be free from unreasonable
searches and seizures subtle distinctions, developed and refined by the
common law in evolving the body of private property law .... " Id.
at 266.
13 342 U.S. 48 (1951). Here the evidence was illegally seized from a hotel
room occupied by the defendant's aunt. The Court held that the re-
spondent, nevertheless, had standing to complain. See People v. Martin,
382 IM. 192, 46 N.E.2d 997 (1942).
14 265 U.S. 57 (1924).
15 232 U.S. 382 (1914).
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said, "the special protection accorded by the Fourth Amendment
to the people in their 'persons, houses, papers, and effects,' is not
extended to the open fields. The distinction between the latter
and the house is as old as the common law. 4 Bl. Comm. 223, 225,
226."16
Many of Mr. Justice Holmes' contemporaries would have
limited the Hester opinion to the facts on which it was based and
the authority which it cited. For example, Cornelius, in his treatise
on search and seizure, refers to Hester in the following manner: 17
In a recent case decided by the United States Supreme Court,
it was held that the special protection accorded by the Fourth
Amendment to the people in their 'persons, houses, papers and
effects' is not extended to the open fields, although the observa-
tions of the court on this point were largely dicta, as the search
under consideration took place upon the premises of the father
of the defendant.
Also, the dissenting circuit judge in Schulte v. United States'8
carefully distinguished the facts of the Hester case from a situation
where federal officers entered the defendant's garage.
It would seem that the Hester doctrine could and should be
severely limited in its stare decisis effect. The case could readily
be distinguished in the future if: (1) the original entry upon the
land were into the curtilage (the space and buildings immediately
surrounding a dwelling house) rather than merely upon the open
fields;0 (2) the entry were upon the defendant's own land; (3)
the property examined had not been first abandoned;2 0 or (4) the
entry had been into any type of close rather than out in the open.
The interpretations of Hester have, however, been quite the con-
trary. The federal judges, in their zeal to enforce the prohibition
laws, found no such distinctions. In contrast to Mr. Justice Holmes'
16 Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57, 59 (1924).
17 CORNELIUS, SEARCH & SEIZURE 6 (2d ed. 1930).
18 11 F.2d 105 (5th Cir. 1926). The court said, "The above reference to the
'open fields' is more euphemious than accurate, and not at all necessary
to the decision rendered [in the Hester case], but at that it is a far cry
from the 'open fields' to a shed within leaping distance of a man's bed-
room." Id. at 107.
10 4 BL. Comm. 224 which states: "And if the barn, stable, or warehouse
be parcel of the mansion-house, and within the same common fence,
though not under the same roof or contiguous, a burglary may be com-
mitted therein; for the capital house protects and privileges all its
branches and appurtenances, if within the curtilage or homestall."
20 Two cases involving abandoned property and premises are Abel v.
United States, 362 U.S. 217 (1960) and Feguer v. United States, 302
F.2d 214 (8th Cir. 1962).
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fear that fourth amendment protection might be extended to the
open fields, the open fields doctrine was extended into the area
formerly protected by the fourth amendment. In a long line of
cases extending from Hester to date, a dichotomy between house
and non-house has been the general rule in search and seizure
cases in the federal courts. This is supported by neither the Hester
case nor any body of common law..2 1
Giacona v. United States22 aptly illustrates the present inter-
pretation of the Hester rule. There, the defendant was convicted
of unlawful possession of marijuana. The evidence in question
had been concealed on a foundation block supporting the sill of a
grocery store operated by the defendant. It was discovered by a
federal officer who searched the area by reaching under the store
building. Nevertheless the court held that the evidence was ad-
missible because "the top of a foundation block, is only a foot
or two removed from the 'open fields' which "are not within the
protection of the Fourth Amendment. '23 This logic seems par-
ticularly inappropriate in light of the Silverman one-fifth inch rule.
The court also quoted from the Hester opinion as follows: "It is
obvious that even if there had been a trespass, the above testimony
was not obtained by an illegal search and seizure. '24 It seems
obvious that this was not an unqualified statement since a trespass
upon an area protected by the fourth amendment is unquestionably
an unreasonable search.25 In support of its holding the court cited
many of the cases which purportedly follow the Hester rationale.
Earlier discussions in accord with the Hester rule include
situations where: federal officers hid behind the defendant's hog
house and watched the back porch of the defendant's house;26
searched the defendant's garage after entering upon his land be-
cause they smelled whiskey;27 searched the defendant's hen house;2
searched a dugout on the defendant's enclosed ranch;29 searched
21 See note 19 supra. See also United States v. Vlahos, 19 F. Supp. 166
(D. Ore. 1937).
22 257 F.2d 450 (5th Cir. 1958).
23 Id. at 456.
24 Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57, 58 (1924).
25 Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 510 (1961).
26 Janney v. United States, 206 F.2d 601 (4th Cir. 1953).
27 Schulte v. United States, 11 F.2d 105 (5th Cir. 1926); cf. Russell v. State,
37 Okla. Cr. 68, 256 Pac. 758 (1927).
28 Carvalho v. United States, 54 F.2d 232 (1st Cir. 1931).
29 Raine v. United States, 229 Fed. 407 (9th Cir. 1924); cf. Wolf v. State,
110 Tex. Cr. 124, 9 S.W.2d 350 (1928).
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the defendant's cabin;30 searched a cave on the defendant's land;31
and peeked through the cracks in the defendant's house.3 2 In not
one of these cases did the judge discuss curtilage as should have
been done, and the rationale was always that of Hester.
B. OTHER TRESPASS CASES
Two other lines of cases concern the Hester area, and they are
seemingly irreconcilable with it. First, one line of federal cases
takes into consideration the distinctions of curtilage and the sanctity
of buildings as such. Secondly, there are a few cases in which
judges have read into the fourth amendment a right of privacy
guarantee.
In the curtilage cases, the courts do not usually mention Hester,
whereas state decisions are often cited.33 Situations held by this
doctrine to be under the ambit of fourth amendment protection
include: narcotics thrown into an enclosed back yard where an
agent was waiting for just such a happenstance, 34 officers following
the defendant's car onto his farm,35 officers entering the defendant's
garage,30 a search of the defendant's Finnish bathhouse, 37 entrance
into the defendant's smoke house,38 and a search of the defendant's
barn.39 The usual rationale of these cases has been that, since the
30 Dulek v. United States, 16 F.2d 275 (6th Cir. 1926); cf. Bare v. Common-
wealth, 122 Va. 783, 94 S.E. 168 (1917).
31 Stark v. United States, 44 F.2d 946 (8th Cir. 1930); cf. Childers v.
Commonwealth, 198 Ky. 848, 250 S.W. 106 (1923).
32 Martin v. United States, 155 F.2d 503 (5th Cir. 1946). The Court here
said, "The Fourth Amendment secured the people against not all, but
only unreasonable searches and seizures of their persons, houses, papers
and effects. Enclosed or unenclosed grounds or open fields around their
houses are not included in the prohibition." Id. at 505. Then the Court
cited Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57 (1924).
33 The state cases almost universally discuss the question of curtilage. See
notes 27, 29, 30 and 31, supra.
34 Hobson v. United States, 226 F.2d 890 (8th Cir. 1955); cf. Fugate v.
Commonwealth, 294 Ky. 410, 171 S.W.2d 1020 (1943).
33 Kroska v. United States, 51 F.2d 330 (8th Cir. 1931).
30 Temperani v. United States, 299 Fed. 365 (9th Cir. 1924). This case,
however, was not reversed because the error was said to be harmless in
the light of the defendant's own incriminating testimony.
37 Wakkuri v. United States, 67 F.2d 844 (6th Cir. 1933). This case cited
the unreversed Temperani case above for its authority.
38 Roberson v. United States, 165 F.2d 752 (6th Cir. 1948).
39 United States v. Di Corvo, 37 F.2d 124 (D. Conn. 1927). See Russell v.
State, 37 Okla. Cr. 68, 256 Pac. 758 (1927).
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standard is to be trespass against a dwelling house, and under any
common law system this includes curtilage, the curtilage must
be within the fourth amendment protection. This would seem to
be a logical analysis of the problem.
Brock v. United States40 is the leading case exemplifying a con-
stitutional right of privacy in search and seizure situations. Its
rationale is based upon the spirit of the fourth amendment to a
greater degree than any other line of cases. In Brock, federal agents
stood outside the defendant's bedroom window and induced him
to make incriminating statements in his sleep. Citing McDonald
v. United States41 (which hardly touches on the issue existing in
the Brock case) the court held that this was a violation of the
defendant's right to be let alone.
The court refused to determine the Brock case on a technical
trespass basis. Instead it asserted:
Whatever quibbles there may be as to where the curtilage
begins and ends, clear it is that standing on a man's premises and
looking in his bedroom window is a violation of his 'right to be let
alone' as guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment.
In addition to the McDonald case, the dissent in Olmstead v. United
States4 2 was cited for this proposition.
Subsequent cases have not gone as far as Brock. Three majority
opinions43 and three dissents44 have cited Brock for its fourth
amendment proposition. In the latest of these cases, Polk v. United
States,45 the court was faced with the question of whether an
officer's entry into a covered passageway between the defendant's
house and another residence constituted an invasion of the defend-
ants' fourth amendment rights. The court was able to fit together
all three lines of search and seizure cases-Hester, the line recog-
nizing curtilage, and the right of privacy cases. They were all
placed in one continuum46 by a careful choice of cases from each
40 223 F.2d 681 (5th Cir. 1955).
41 335 U.S. 451 (1948).
42 277 U.S. 438 (1928) (see note 10 supra).
43 Polk v. United States, 291 F.2d 230, 232 (9th Cir. 1961); United States
v. Gordon, 236 F.2d 916, 920 (2d Cir. 1956); Hobson v. United States,
226 F.2d 890, 894 (8th Cir. 1955) (see note 34 supra); cf. Harris v.
State, 203 Md. 165, 99 A.2d 725 (1953).
44 Smith v. United States, 234 F.2d 385, 397 (5th Cir. 1956); United States
v. Greenewald, 233 F.2d 556, 582 (2d Cir. 1956); Bowers v. United
States, 226 F.2d 424, 442 (8th Cir. 1955).
45 291 F.2d 230 (9th Cir. 1961).
46 The Court said, "It has been held that such protection [of the fourth
amendment] does not extend to open fields, Hester v. United States,
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group. The difficulty with this plan is that certain cases (such as
Giacona v. United States, supra) do not fit within the continuum.
Brock, although having little case law support, is probably the
most forward looking decision in the search and seizure area to
date-not because of the fact situation upon which the decision was
written, but because of the terms in which the statement of the
rationale is couched. The decision speaks of "the basic principles
which underlie these [fourth and fifth amendment] rights," and
it finds that these principles include: (1) the "decent privacy of
home, papers and effects which is indispensable to individual
dignity and self-respect"; and (2) the authority of the courts "to
oblige the government to control itself. ' 4 A blind following of
the words of the fourth amendment without first considering its
underlying principles makes little sense in the light of the fact
that our Constitution was written over a century ago by men who,
like ourselves, were forced to translate their ideas in terms of their
own times.
III. TRESPASS AND THE GOVERNMENT AGENT'S STATUS
UPON THE LAND-AUTHORIZED ENCROACHMENTS
Thus far this article has dealt only with the problem of de-
fining the areas to be given fourth amendment protection. There
is also a question of the government agent's status upon the land.
Once an officer is found to be a trespasser upon a constitutionally
protected area, he is thereupon unable to again obtain a non-
trespassory status48 which would render admissible any evidence
1924, 265 U.S. 57; not to a cabin 230 feet from a dwelling, Dulek v.
United States, 16 F.2d 275 (6th Cir. 1926); but it has extended to an
enclosed back yard, Hobson v. United States, 226 F.2d 890, 894 (8th Cir.
1955); and spying through a transom from a common hallway after
breaking into a rooming house has been held a violation of the Fourth
Amendment, McDonald v. United States, 1948, 335 U.S. 451; so has
standing on a man's premises and looking in his bedroom window, Brock
v. United States, 223 F.2d 681 (5th Cir. 1955); and searching a locked
cupboard in a common hallway, United States v. Lumia, 36 F. Supp. 552
(W.D.N.Y. 1941)." Id. at 232.
47 Brock v. United States, 223 F.2d 681, 684 (5th Cir. 1955).
48 In Work v. United States, 243 F.2d 660 (D.C. Cir. 1957), the officers
went into the vestibule of a rooming house without invitation. Informa-
tion which was received by watching the defendant go outdoors and put
a package containing narcotics into the garbage was held inadmissible.
It is noteworthy that the same information could have been obtained
had they waited across the street and procured the package later from
the garbage man. Evidence gained in the latter manner would un-
doubtedly have been admissible.
An analagous result was reached in United States v. Watson, 189
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seized. For example, if the officer enters a protected area with a
defective warrant, anything he takes is illegally seized.49 Likewise,
if he enters that portion of the defendant's land which is constitu-
tionally protected while falsely claiming a right to enter, or under
any other false pretense, anything he may thereby learn is in-
admissible. Some cases reach this result in terms of the so-called
"unlawful collateral purpose" doctrine,50 while others reach the
same decision without referring to the doctrine by name.51
The prosecution has still another out. Even though the area in
question is entitled to fourth amendment protection, if the officer's
presence is not through a trespass (and he retains the status of
non-trespasser), any evidence obtained is admissible. An officer
has no duty to close his eyes to such evidence.52 The courts simply
say that there was no search,53 let alone an illegal one.54 This
F. Supp. 776 (S.D. Cal. 1960), where the defendant voluntarily handed
over a can of marijuana after the agents broke into his apartment. The
evidence was excluded. The court said that the illegal entry tainted
every step of the journey. See also, dissent in Wong Sun v. United
States, 288 F.2d 366, 372 (9th Cir. 1961), for like reasoning.
40 Mattingly v. Commonwealth, 197 Ky. 583, 247 S.W. 938 (1923).
50 United States v. Evans, 194 F. Supp. 90 (D.D.C. 1961).
51 In Marron v. United States, 8 F.2d 251 (9th Cir. 1925), where police
entered saying they were sanitary inspectors, and thereby discovered
illegal liquor, the evidence and testimony were held inadmissible.
Also, in United States v. Mitchneck, 2 F. Supp. 225 (M.D. Penn.
1933), where officers gained entrance into the defendant's house by say-
ing they were refrigerator salesmen, and by the use of a note to the
defendant purporting to be from the defendant's employer, but with
the employer's signature forged upon it, the evidence seized later with
a warrant was held inadmissible.
52 Ellison v. United States, 206 F.2d 476 (D.C. Cir. 1953); cf. People v.
Schmoll, 383 Ill. 280, 48 N.E.2d 933 (1943).
53 See People v. Albea, 2 Ill. 2d 317, 118 N.E.2d 277 (1954). In Paper v.
United States, 53 F.2d 184 (4th Cir. 1931), the officers, while searching
for the defendant on his premises under a lawful arrest warrant, acci-
dentally found liquor in the cellar. The evidence was held admissible
because the officers were "lawfully on the premises."
54 In Ellison v. United States, 206 F.2d 476 (D.C. Cir. 1953), police officers
sought to question the defendant. While they were on his front porch,
they saw bottles from the drugstore which had been burglarized lying
in the front yard. The evidence was held admissible on the ground that
there was no search and that the officers were not required to close
their eyes to evidence in plain sight.
Likewise, in Cradle v. United States, 178 F.2d 962 (D.C. Cir. 1949),
there was held to have been no search where the officer merely stood
in an area open to the public and observed gambling activity through
an open door.
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conclusion seems to stem from the fact that a police officer entering
upon the land in the performance of his lawful duty is a licensee-
the license being conferred by law.55 By the same reasoning, an
officer who comes into a shop or public place is not a trespasser
and may obtain evidence which will be held admissible in court.56
Authority to go upon the constitutionally protected area has
been based, for the most part, upon common law tort and property
standards. This problem is in the same state of ambiguity as are
the issues of delimiting the protected area, and determining what
constitutes an encroachment thereon.
IV. THE END PRODUCT OF THE TRESPASS-PROTECTED
AREA TEST
The most recent case illustrating the difficulty in this area,
and emphasizing the varied and inconsistent approaches to the
problem, is Foster v. United States.5 7 Two federal officers came
upon the defendant's land to question him. Twice previously Foster
had refused to answer questions and had ordered other officers off
the land. Nevertheless, the officers went onto the porch and rang
the bell. Foster came to the door and, when the officers were
identified, ordered them to "get the hell from the property." When
the officers persisted in their attempts to talk to him, Foster pro-
duced a rifle and the officers left. He was convicted of interfering
with United States officials. The Court of Appeals upheld the con-
viction, citing two cases contrary to Foster's contention that the
evidence was inadmissible as having been obtained in contravention
of the fourth amendment. 58 It cited the Giacona case59 which is
the tortured result of the line of cases based on Hester, and in
which this same court found no distinction between the open fields
and the very cornerstone of a building. The second case cited was
Hester.6 0 With one of two findings the appeal would have gone in
the defendant's favor. First, the court could have recognized some
55 PROSSER, TORTS 461 (2d ed. 1955).
56 See Fisher v. United States, 205 F.2d 702 (D.C. Cir. 1953); On Lee v.
United States, 343 U.S. 747 (1952).
57 296 F.2d 65 (5th Cir. 1961).
58 Foster's contention in the appellate proceeding was that the officers
were trespassers because: (1) he had previously told other officers to
stay off his land; and (2) he told the officers in question to get off the
land. See State v. Frizzelle, 243 N.C. 49, 89 S.E.2d 727 (1955).
59 Giacona v. United States, 257 F.2d 450 (5th Cir. 1958); see State v. Egan,
272 S.W.2d 719 (Mo. App. 1954).
60 Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57 (1924).
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of the niceties of trespass law and held that a licensee who stays
upon the premises when he is ordered to leave becomes a tres-
passer.6' Or, the court could have recognized that a trespass upon
the porch is a trespass against the home under the common law
concept of curtilage. The first ground is almost universally held
to be a part of tort law; and the second is recognized in all jurisdic-
tions (with the possible exception of the federal court finding in
reliance upon Hester,62 that the front porch is an open field). The
end result seems to be that, since the Supreme Court has vacillated
between use and non-use of common law and local law, some federal
courts have developed and followed hard and fast dichotomies
without adequately considering the possible impairment of a de-
fendant's rights.
Another route of reversal open to the court in the Foster case
was the Brock right of privacy concept.63 Under this doctrine, any
unreasonable invasion of Foster's right of privacy would bring the
testimony under the exclusionary rule based upon the fourth
amendment. This route does not seem to present as strong a case
for Foster as the points mentioned above because the questions of
reasonableness and the extent of his right are still open to the
court. Nevertheless, it would seem that if officers can come upon
Foster's porch and remain there against his wishes, he has been
denied the right of privacy to which he is constitutionally entitled.
The Supreme Court, however, although deciding many times
that the right of privacy is at the core of the fourth amendment
guarantee, 4 has shown surprising reluctance to decide cases such
as Foster in terms of this rationale.
V. CONCLUSIONS
The test of unauthorized physical encroachment within a con-
stitutionally protected area is a good beginning in the search and
seizure area for, if any court finds such encroachment, the question
61 PROSSER, TORTS 62 (2d ed. 1955).
62 Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57 (1924).
63 Brock v. United States, 223 F.2d 681 (5th Cir. 1955). This route was
attempted in the Giacona case, supra note 59, but the court distinguished
the Brock case on the fact that the building involved in Brock was a
home, while the one involved in Giacona was a grocery store open to
the public. Such a distinction hardly seems reasonable when it can be
implemented only by holding that the area on top of a cornerstone
under a building is also open to the public.
64 Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505 (1961); Wolf v. Colorado, 338
U.S. 25 (1949).
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can be decided and set aside with no more ado. It is quite evident
that the terms of the test must be defined, and that the United
States Supreme Court must make that definition. Constitutional
questions should not turn upon state or local law; otherwise con-
stitutional rights will be diverse and uncertain.
As to delimiting the constitutionally protected area, the Su-
preme Court needs only to state that this means those areas treated
by the public as being private.65 This is a standard which is work-
able. It is true that there would be a question in each case of
whether or not the area searched had been treated as private, but
judges, litigants, and police officers can at least understand the
concept of privacy. The judge would not be forced to turn to ancient
local law to decide a case, or be forced to decide that any area
which he believed to be outside the protection of the fourth amend-
ment was a part of the open fields.
The question of whether the encroachment is unauthorized can
be settled just as easily. The Supreme Court could simply rule that
an officer has no authority to go upon the protected area unless:
(1) he has a warrant; (2) he has been given authority to do so by
the voluntary act of the person in control of such area; or (3) he
has personal knowledge that the subject of his search is within the
constitutionally protected area, and probable cause to believe that
such subject would be destroyed or removed before he could obtain
a warrant.
Such a rule would cause the exclusion of evidence obtained by
peeking into the defendant's window, standing upon his porch con-
trary to his wishes, searching the very foundation of his building,
and surreptitiously moving about on the defendant's own premises.
This would be a good start. But after the initial application of
the trespass test, the Court must look even further to see if the
defendant's fourth amendment rights have been violated, for it is
evident that science will soon eliminate the need for one man to
go physically onto another's property in order to pry into his private
65 See Lanza v. State of New York, 82 Sup. Ct. 1218 (1962), where in what
Mr. Justice Brennan characterized in his opinion in that same case as a
"gratuitous exposition of several grave constitutional issues confessedly
not before us." Mr. Justice Stewart set out some of the cases which have
delineated the scope of the fourth amendment. He then refused to
attempt "either to define or predict the ultimate scope of the Fourth
Amendment protection"; stated that it was "obvious that a jail shares
none of the attributes of a home, an automobile, an office, or a hotel
room"; and decided the case on other grounds. It was not necessary to
reach the constitutional question in deciding the case.
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and most intimate affairs.66 A test similar to that used in the
Brock case67 might be employed. Regardless of whether or not
there has been a physical encroachment, the defendant's rights may
be effectively denied, as they have been in the wire-tap area.68
The test should be that, even if there has been no physical encroach-
ment, if the same effect is obtained by the use of a device developed
in scientific technology, the evidence must be excluded.
This additional qualification would, in all courts, 69 exclude
evidence obtained by long range listening devices, telescopes, wire-
tapping, and other spying equipment.
66 See Mr. Justice Brandeis' dissent in Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S.
438,471 (1928).
67 Brock v. United States, 223 F.2d 681 (5th Cir. 1955).
68 Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505 (1961). See Mr. Justice Douglas'
concurring opinion id. at 512.
69 Under Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), the exclusionary rule of Weeks
v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914) is binding upon state court pro-
ceedings and is on a constitutionally guaranteed basis. See Broeder,
The Decline and Fall of Wolf v. Colorado, 41 NEB. L. REV. 185 (1961).
